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Do Unconscious Emotions Involve Unconscious Feelings? 
 
Abstract 
 
The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about 
emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a 
number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary 
remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious 
emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and 
unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. 
 The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to 
provide a framework for the debate, and identify a number of key issues for further research. 
Second, a number of the positions depend for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments 
which can be made clear, but cannot be evaluated in detail, in a survey article. Third, I believe no 
fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed. 
 
Keywords 
Emotion 
Unconscious 
Feelings 
Consciousness 
 
 3 
Do Unconscious Emotions Involve Unconscious Feelings? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the flurry of recent debate about the nature of emotions, comparatively little attention has been 
given to the question of unconscious emotions. But it is clear that we need the concept in order to 
make sense of human behaviour. It is commonplace for people to later realise what they felt, but 
were not consciously aware of feeling, at an earlier time; everyday explanations of people’s 
behaviour, perhaps particularly in personal relationships, require us to attribute to them emotions 
of which they are not aware; literature is full of examples and illustrations of characters’ 
ignorance and self-deception regarding what they feel. Yet the philosophers and psychologists 
who do at least explicitly mention unconscious emotions spend relatively little time developing 
their position and defending it against objections. 
 Perhaps part of the general reticence on this issue has stemmed from the thought that 
there is very little to discuss, that the concept of an unconscious emotion is impossibly 
paradoxical; and so however we are to make sense of people’s emotional lives, this concept will 
have no role. Predominant in this line of thought is the notion that “unconscious emotion” 
involves a commitment to unfelt feeling; and this is taken to be so obviously nonsensical, few 
philosophers have felt the need to provide an argument against it (Clore, 1994). The very idea of 
unconscious emotions has been thought puzzling even within what is perhaps its most natural 
home, psychoanalysis. Freud remarked, “It is surely the essence of an emotion that we should be 
aware of it, i.e. that it should become known to consciousness” (Freud, 1915, p. 179).  
 This article surveys a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle 
and provides some preliminary remarks about their viability. The discussion is exploratory rather 
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than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to provide a framework for the debate, and 
identify a number of key issues for further research. Second, a number of the positions depend 
for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments which cannot be evaluated in detail in a 
survey article. In these cases, my aim is the more limited one of situating the accounts within 
such commitments. The third reason the discussion is not an attempt to reach a decisive 
conclusion is that I believe no fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed. 
 We can divide up answers to the title question into three families. The first two reject the 
idea of unconscious feelings. The first family claims that unconscious emotions involve 
conscious feelings. This family has two branches. The first branch, of which the views of Patricia 
Greenspan (1988) and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2000) are examples, claims that the conscious feelings 
are misunderstood (§ 5). The second branch, exemplified by Peter Goldie (2000), defends a 
distinction in consciousness, arguing that unconscious emotions are consciously felt, but that the 
subject remains unaware of the feeling (§ 6).  
 The second family of theories denies that unconscious emotions involve feelings at all. It 
also has two branches, represented by Martha Nussbaum (2001) and Robert Roberts (2003), who 
each provide a different kind of argument for separating emotions from feelings (§ 8, 9).  
The third family defends the idea of unconscious feelings, and argues that they are involved in 
unconscious emotions, usually on psychoanalytic grounds (§ 10). This family includes the 
theories of Sebastian Gardner (1993) and Richard Wollheim (1984). 
 This division into three families is further complicated by those theories that seek to use 
physiological or neurophysiological criteria for emotion and feeling rather than purely 
psychological criteria. Interpretations of the theories of Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999) are 
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possible within each of the families distinguished, depending on how the relation between bodily 
or neurophysiological change and consciousness is conceived (§ 11, 12). 
 There are, of course, other important theorists presenting arguments within each of these 
families. This survey is not comprehensive in that sense. My main concern is with the families 
and their branches as potential solutions to the puzzle of unconscious emotions, rather than with 
individual differences between theories within each branch. So I shall use just those theories 
mentioned to exemplify the type of solution offered in each case and the objections it faces. 
 
2. What is an Unconscious Emotion? 
2.1. A Definition 
It would be helpful to have a definition of “unconscious emotion”. Unfortunately, any 
informative definition will already be committed to a certain position, or at least family, in the 
spectrum of possibilities. The only point on which all theories agree is that an unconscious 
emotion is an emotion that the subject is not aware of in such a way as to be able to avow it 
directly and non-inferentially (the last three words are intended to rule out a case of inference 
from one’s behaviour). Whether and how the subject is aware of it in any way at all is 
contentious, and an important aspect of the question we face. 
 Like all definitions relating to consciousness, there is a puzzle about how the 
epistemological and phenomenological aspects of the definition relate. The concept of “feeling” 
reflects this. Commonsense suggests that the type of awareness involved in feeling an emotion 
essentially involves phenomenology, i.e. the epistemological access that enables direct and non-
inferential avowal of an emotion necessarily involves, even if it cannot be reduced to, “feelings”. 
I shall assume that this account of feeling an emotion is correct and will therefore talk of feeling 
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(verb) an emotion as involving feelings (noun). However, I leave it open, as a matter of dispute, 
as to whether “feelings” are or involve qualia, or are entirely reducible to intentional content.1 
 It will emerge in the course of the argument that I believe that different accounts of why 
or how an emotion is unconscious are appropriate in different cases. In other words, there are 
different ways in which an emotion may be unconscious; there is not just one description of the 
subject that is applicable in all cases. A theory of unconscious emotion therefore needs to be able 
to encompass these different ways in which emotions may be unconscious. This will form an 
important criticism of the first family of theories, that claim unconscious emotions involve 
conscious feelings. These theories rule out the possibility that unconscious feelings can occur. 
By contrast, the theories that allow for unconscious feelings do not reject the claim that 
unconscious emotions may also involve conscious feelings. The latter theories are therefore more 
ecumenical, which may prove a strength. 
 
2.2. An Example 
In the absence of a fuller definition of unconscious emotion, we can at least begin with a case to 
think about, to sharpen our intuitions against. Freud’s famous case study Notes on an 
Obsessional Neurosis (1909), better known as “the Rat Man”, provides helpful instances. I 
choose a psychoanalytic case study at least in part because emotions that are unconscious in the 
manner exemplified by psychoanalytic case studies are the most difficult to account for. Some 
theorists may feel that if their views can’t account for this type of “psychoanalytically 
unconscious” emotion, so much the worse for the claim that such emotions exist. However, I find 
                                                
1 This debate arises in § V, where I give some support to the claim that feelings are not just qualia, i.e. entirely 
divorced from the intentional content of the emotion. 
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the concept as used in the case study below independently plausible, on the grounds that I cannot 
see how to make sense of human behaviour without it. 
 The “Rat Man” was a man in his late 20s, training as a lawyer at university, who suffered 
from obsessive compulsive disorder. His case name derives from a powerful and recurrent 
fantasy or fear that precipitated his seeking treatment with Freud. His captain in the army had 
told him of a punishment used in the East—a pot containing rats is placed on the buttocks of the 
prisoner, and they bore their way into his anus. When the Rat Man heard this, it flashed through 
his mind that this was happening (inflicted impersonally) to the two people he loved most, to the 
woman he was romantically involved with and to his father.  
 On a day when the Rat Man’s lady was leaving after visiting him, his foot knocked a 
stone, and he felt obliged to move it to the side of the road in case her carriage, which would pass 
that way, would strike the stone and be overturned. He walked on a bit, but then thought his 
action was ridiculous, and he felt obliged to go back and put the stone back in the middle of the 
road.  
 Now most of us, when we feel we’ve done something ridiculous, don’t feel a compulsion 
to go back to the scene of action and “undo” it! So, as Freud says,  
 
We shall not be forming a correct judgement of this second part of the compulsive act 
if we take it at its face value as having merely been a critical repudiation of a 
pathological action. The fact that it was accompanied by a sense of compulsion 
betrays it as having itself been a part of the pathological action, though a part which 
was determined by a motive contrary to that which produced the first part. (Freud, 
1909, p. 72)  
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 On the basis of a great deal more information than we have time to rehearse, it became 
clear that the first gesture expressed the Rat Man’s conscious love; the “undoing” action 
expressed his unconscious hatred. Freud goes further: his obsession for protecting his lady was 
actually a reaction to his unconscious hatred, which threatened his love. His hatred, therefore, 
was in fact active in his removing the stone as well as his replacing it (see Wollheim, 1984, Ch. 
5). 
 
3. Emotions: Episodes and Dispositions 
To think about what unconscious emotions might be and whether they involve unconscious 
feelings, we need first to make an important distinction which is not always noted in the 
literature. Goldie (2000, pp. 12–16) argues for a distinction between episodes of emotional 
experience and emotions themselves. Many contemporary analyses of emotion are in fact 
analyses of episodes of emotional experience. Goldie, however, argues that we attribute 
emotions on the basis of their place in a narrative. For example, if a man is jealous of a rival—an 
emotion that may last for years—this does not consist simply in an episode, or even several 
episodes, of his consciously feeling jealousy, but also in thoughts, other feelings, and bodily 
states, and dispositions to all these. What makes the emotion jealousy is given by the terms in 
which we understand him, his life, and his relations to the object of his desire and his rivals. 
Emotions, and the ascription of emotions, find their home in the narrative structure of people’s 
lives. 
 On this account, emotions are dispositions: “He is proud of his children”, “she is afraid of 
snakes”, even “he is angry with his boss today.” None of these attributions are reducible to the 
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attribution of a constant, continuing episodic mental state (whether this is thought to be of feeling 
(Goldie, 2000), thinking (Nussbaum, 2001), or construing (Roberts, 2003)). The dispositions 
attributed are manifest most directly in episodes of felt emotion, and such episodes have a special 
place in our understanding of what emotion is. But we should not think that such episodes of 
feeling (thinking, construing etc.) are all there is to an emotion. This is obvious in being proud of 
one’s children or afraid of snakes, which last a long time. But even in the case of being angry at 
one’s boss for a day, there is an intuitive way of understanding this that is not simply equivalent 
to a persistent episodic state. The feeling (or episodic thought) may come and go, for instance 
with natural redirections of attention. Whether I am still angry the next day, for example, is 
decided (in part) by whether I am disposed to feel angry once again. Whether the disposition 
begins and ends with the episode of feeling is a discovery we need to make; and so even if it 
does, the two are logically distinct and we can understand the feeling as the manifestation of the 
disposition.  
 Emotions also have histories and can undergo change. The emotions we have now, what 
and how we love, hate, fear, etc. involve accretions, past objects of emotion that colour and 
shape our responses to present objects. Philosophers who have built this idea of history into their 
theory of emotion tend to analyse emotions in terms of the subject’s evaluative understanding of 
the world. Wollheim (1999, 2003) argues that emotions are evaluative attitudes, or orientations, 
towards the world or objects within it. This is easily combined with Goldie’s account: how 
someone understands the world and what is of importance in it has a history and can be given a 
narrative form.2 
                                                
2 Psychoanalysts might well add to this an account of the history of an emotion in terms of phantasy. Phantasy may 
be seen as the vehicle by which our present emotional experience is coloured by our past emotional objects; the 
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 This is the understanding of emotion I shall assume in this paper, and not seek to defend 
further. The Rat Man’s unconscious hatred is a disposition; the episode of his removing and 
replacing the stone was an episode of unconscious hatred—whether or how it was ‘felt’ is our 
question. Assuming this analysis does not disadvantage accounts that have analysed emotions as 
episodes of emotional experience. These accounts allow that we have dispositions to emotional 
experience, that these dispositions are closely related to and interact with dispositions to certain 
types of thought and behaviour. Adherents to these accounts can, therefore, take what is said 
below about emotions as applying to such dispositions. I will make clear when a theorist’s 
analysis of emotion is, in Goldie’s terms, an analysis of an episode of emotional experience. 
 
4. Defining the Puzzle 
With the distinction between emotion and episodes of emotional experience in place, and 
understanding emotion as an evaluative orientation, it may seem there is no puzzle as to how 
emotions could be unconscious. For there is no reason to think that we are aware of our 
evaluative orientations to the world; and plenty of reasons to believe that not only are we often 
unaware of such orientations, but we are motivated to be so. Our evaluations of others, ourselves 
and the situations we face can be painful, either for what they reveal about the situation or about 
ourselves. As a result, we avoid recognising them. 
 But although this is correct, it overlooks the rest of Goldie’s analysis, viz. that these 
orientations are dispositions to, among other things, episodes of emotional experience, which, 
until we have an argument to believe otherwise, we should take to mean episodes of feeling that 
                                                
history of emotion is the history of phantasy and its objects. For a philosophical exploration and defence, see 
Gardner (1992) and Gardner (1993, Ch. 6). 
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emotion. If the emotion—the evaluative orientation—is to remain unconscious, then any 
episodes of feeling that emotion cannot become (fully) conscious; the subject cannot be fully 
cognizant of the feeling and what it is a feeling of, or she would thereby become fully cognizant 
of the emotion itself, and be able to avow it.  
 This leads to the three solutions presented in the introduction: unconscious emotions are 
felt consciously, but the subject is not fully cognizant of them in some way (family 1); or 
unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings (family 3); or they do not involve feelings at 
all (family 2). 
 On the type of evidence appealed to in the first paragraph, and cases such as the Rat Man, 
we should not adopt a purely dispositional account of unconscious emotion. The same 
considerations that lead us to posit unconscious emotions in the first place also incline us to 
attribute episodes of emotion of which the subject is unaware (this is inherent in Freud’s idea of 
the “dynamic unconscious”). Since “experience” has connections to consciousness, let us say 
these are episodes of unconscious emotional “activity”. Unconscious emotions are dispositions to 
such, among other manifestations. How we should understand these episodes is the question. 
 It is obvious that the Rat Man was undergoing an episode of emotional feeling while 
moving the stone—his love, his sense of compulsion, his sense of his action being ridiculous 
were all felt. But what is missing from his report is his feeling hatred; this he denied. Yet his 
hatred was “active” in his moving the stone; it was not just a disposition, but a disposition being 
manifest at that moment. His unconscious emotion of hatred was expressed in action and had 
effects upon his conscious mental states. In his interpretation, Freud relates the feelings of 
protective love, compulsion, and the sense of ridiculousness to the unconscious hatred. Should 
we say that the episode of unconscious hatred occurred without any feeling of hatred, e.g. as an 
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episodic thought without feeling? Or did the Rat Man feel his hatred? If so, did he feel it 
consciously or unconsciously? 
 
5. Unconscious Emotions Involve Conscious Feelings I 
5.1. Theory 
I turn first to those theories that maintain that unconscious emotions are felt consciously. (I 
interpret the idea of “feeling” psychologically, except in §§ 11–12, where physiological and 
neurological theories of feeling will be discussed.) The first theory of this kind I shall call 
“conscious feelings I”. 
 There is no inconsistency in maintaining that unconscious emotions manifest themselves 
in conscious feelings. What makes it appear so is the additional assumption that conscious 
feelings would reveal the unconscious emotion, rendering it conscious. But although it is perhaps 
normal for feelings to reveal the existence and nature of the emotions they manifest, it is 
obviously true that this is not universally so. 
 Because episodes of emotional feeling are manifestations of emotion, in the normal case 
the occurrence of feeling informs us about the emotion, for example, which emotion we feel, that 
an old emotion we thought had died is still extant, that a new one has formed, or that a familiar 
one is present. However, feelings may be confused, unclear, and in need of interpretation. Just to 
experience the feeling cannot by itself inform us of the nature of the emotion. As Wollheim 
argues (1999, p. 10; 2003, p. 22), to understand feelings, we must relate them to the emotions 
they manifest. We cannot understand that what we feel is anger unless we come to understand 
that we are angry. It is only through associating the feeling to the disposition that we are able to 
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fully recognise the feeling for what it is. If we are unable to relate the feeling to the emotion 
correctly, the feeling remains obscure and the emotion unknown.3 
 This, then, allows for the possibility that a subject does not understand what he feels. The 
feeling may be identified as “a feeling” without being identified as the type of feeling it is. It 
may simply be not understood, or it may be misidentified or misunderstood as manifesting an 
emotion it does not, in fact, manifest.4 The subject thereby misunderstands the emotion he feels. 
We should reject Descartes’ claim that passions “are so close and internal to our soul that it is 
impossible it should feel them without their truly being as it feels them” (1650, Article 26). It is 
possible, therefore, for there to be an episode of conscious feeling that manifests an unconscious 
emotion without the emotion ceasing to be unconscious. It remains unconscious as a result of the 
subject’s not correctly understanding his feeling; he is unable to associate the feeling to the 
evaluative orientation on the world that he in fact has, but is unaware of. 
                                                
3 This claim needs to be distinguished from the different and separate claim that the feelings may be indistinct 
because the emotion itself is indeterminate. Charles Taylor (1985) argues that our emotions involve self-
interpretation, and it may not be true of me that I have a particular emotion until I have interpreted myself as having 
that emotion. This is not a claim that is particularly about unconscious emotion, for once I have reached my self-
interpretation, supposing it is sufficiently accurate and true to myself to resolve my uncertainty, the resulting 
determinate emotion is conscious. I am supposing that in cases such as the Rat Man, that he feels hatred, even if the 
precise content of that hatred is indeterminate, is sufficiently determinate independent of and prior to his self-
interpretation. Freud’s explanation – and indeed, I believe, any plausible explanation – of the stone-moving episode 
requires this degree of mental realism. That Taylor would probably accept this realism as consonant with his 
interpretive constructivism is indicated by his acceptance of limits on self-interpretation: “in offering a 
characterization [of our feelings], these feelings open the question whether this characterization is 
adequate...whether we have properly explicated what the feeling gives us a sense of” (1985, p. 64). 
4 As misidentification is a type of misunderstanding, I shall speak just of the latter from now on. 
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 We may add that this lack of self-understanding may be a result of psychological 
defence, particularly in the sorts of cases in which psychoanalysis is most interested. That is to 
say, the misunderstanding is motivated by the wish to avoid mental pain (anxiety, distress, guilt, 
shame and so on). Because to recognise the emotion would cause pain, it is kept unconscious (on 
this theory, by misunderstanding the feelings that manifest it). On this account, the Rat Man is 
conscious of the feelings that manifest his hatred during the episode described above, but does 
not understand his feelings in relation to hatred. His hatred therefore remains unconscious. 
 
5.2. Evaluation 
As noted at the outset, the view that feelings must be conscious is very widespread amongst 
philosophers and psychologists. As a result, “conscious feelings I” is perhaps the default position 
in the literature. It is therefore worth spending some time developing the debate between its 
defenders and its detractors.5 
 This account is undoubtedly true in some, perhaps many, cases of what we may call 
“unconscious emotion”. It is intuitively plausible that to think that while feeling an emotion, we 
can mistake its object, its significance, or even confuse it with another type of emotion that can 
feel similar. Self-deception often appears to work on this basis. 
 But the theory is unsatisfactory as a general account, i.e. it is a correct description of how 
and why some emotions are unconscious, but it cannot account for all unconscious emotions.  
 
                                                
5 I thank an anonymous reviewer for clarifying the need to present and defend my objections in detail, and for a 
number of the points that follow defending the theory that unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings. 
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5.2.1. The problem of feelings 
A first objection is that its explanation of the case of the Rat Man is implausible, because it 
requires the Rat Man to radically misunderstand his feelings. We are asked to suppose that his 
feeling of hatred can still meaningfully be described as a feeling of hatred, and all that changes is 
the understanding of it. But can the Rat Man—or anyone—mistake the feeling of hatred for, say, 
a feeling of ridiculousness and compulsion, or even solicitous love? Is it not more plausible that 
something apart from straightforward misunderstanding, or lack of understanding, is occurring? 
 A possible reply is based on the claim, which both Greenspan (1988, pp. 4–5) and Ben-
Ze’ev (2000, pp. 49–50, 63–66) defend, that emotional feelings on their own carry very little 
information. They are not “rich” in the intentional content of the emotion, but separate from it, 
occurring along simple dimensions of pleasure and pain. It is wrong, then, to say that the Rat 
Man “feels his hatred”. Rather, he is conscious of the feeling “component” associated with his 
hatred. But his feeling, taken in isolation, is not a feeling “of hatred”, as though hatred could be 
read off from the feeling. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that feelings associated with hatred, 
taken in isolation from the emotion, could be misunderstood for the sorts of feelings the Rat Man 
describes and avows. Feelings only seem laden with greater intentional content, if they do at all, 
once we have linked the feeling to its associated emotion. 
 However, we may object that making feelings so lacking in content empties the claim 
that the unconscious emotion is felt of meaning. It would be better to say that some generic 
feeling of discomfort occurs: If feeling is so lacking in content, what distinguishes the claim that 
the Rat Man feels hatred from the Rat Man feels anxious?  
 (Perhaps we should say the Rat Man feels anxious instead of feeling hatred, i.e. given that 
we can attribute hatred to him on the basis of the narrative of his life, we would expect him to 
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feel hatred. But at the moments when we expect that feeling, he reports anxiety instead. This is 
an interesting response, but to say this is distinct from saying that he feels, but misunderstands, 
his feeling of hatred. The hatred does not remain unconscious as a result of misunderstood 
feelings, but because the feelings associated with its episodes of activity are not feelings of 
hatred, but of anxiety. If this suggestion is right, there is clearly a complex story to be told about 
the relation between the unconscious hatred, the “missing” feelings of hatred, and the conscious 
feelings that appear in their stead.) 
 Second, leaving aside the issue of how to interpret the Rat Man, the defence crucially 
depends on the contentious claim that feelings have virtually no intentional content. The 
suggested separation of feeling from content applies not just to unconscious emotion, but is a 
general account of the nature of all emotion. Several theorists have provided different and 
independent arguments that feelings are more richly intentional than this theory allows (Goldie, 
2000, Ch. 3; Nussbaum, 2001, Ch. 1, §§ 4, 6; Wollheim, 1999, Ch. II, § 11; Wollheim, 2003). It 
is correct, they argue, to talk of “feelings of hatred” rather than “the feeling component 
associated with hatred”. What makes hatred hatred is at least partially manifest in the feeling 
itself. If this were not so, we might wonder how, in the normal run of things, we are able to 
identify our emotions from our feelings with such ease. If feelings were so “thin”, much more 
explicit thought would be necessary to “work out” what emotions we feel. This point does not 
entail the implausible claim that we can simply “read off” our emotions from our feelings. There 
is more to go on than “component” theorists think, but feelings still require interpretation. We 
don’t have space to review this debate here (though see §§ 8.1 and 10.1 below for points from 
Nussbaum and Wollheim). 
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 This first objection, then, takes the form of a dilemma: the “thinner” feelings are, the 
more plausible the claim that we can be conscious of the feeling “component” of an unconscious 
emotion, but the less plausible the theory of feelings. However, making feelings “thicker” makes 
it more and more necessary to say that conscious feelings must be radically misunderstood for 
the associated emotion to remain unconscious. 
 
5.2.2. Defence and the problem of motivation 
A second objection, this time from the defenders of unconscious feelings, turns our attention to 
those cases in which misunderstanding the feeling is motivated in a way psychoanalysis 
describes, viz. the misunderstanding is the result of a defence mechanism.6 Psychoanalysis notes 
that one reason why emotions are kept unconscious, e.g. as in the case of the Rat Man, is that 
they are painful. In response to the painful emotion, a psychological defence operates which 
attempts to reduce or eliminate the pain. Since to feel and understand the emotion consciously 
would be painful, the defence keeps the emotion unconscious.  
 According to ‘conscious feelings I’, feelings are conscious, and so any pain that an 
unconscious emotion causes would be conscious. Hence, defence can only work if it prevents 
pain through a lack of understanding of the conscious feelings that manifest the emotion. In other 
words, this lack of understanding is caused by an anticipation of the pain that true understanding 
would bring.  
 The objection that defenders of unconscious feelings bring is that this cannot be an 
adequate account of defence. Instead, they claim, we must suppose that the emotion is painful, 
                                                
6 The locus classicus on defence mechanisms is Freud, A. (1968). For a brief introduction, see Lacewing (2005). For 
a lengthier philosophical discussion, see Gardner (1993), Chh. 5, 6. 
 18 
and psychological defence operates to prevent this pain from becoming conscious. If they are 
right, there is unconscious pain, and since pain is a type of feeling, there can be unconscious 
feelings. Unconscious pain cannot be understood as pain which is felt consciously but 
misunderstood. Simply misunderstanding such pain is insufficient to keep it unconscious—
misunderstood pain is still painful, and so ‘conscious feelings I’ can’t account for the pain that 
motivates our misunderstanding. 
 I shall return to this argument when looking at unconscious feelings in § 9. 
 
5.2.3. The problem of the absent feeling 
A third and final objection is this: what can this theory say about cases in which the subject 
reports no particular feeling at a time when we would expect and want to attribute an episode of 
emotional experience? As this forms an objection to the next theory, “conscious feelings II”, as 
well, I shall discuss this in § 6.2.2. 
 
6. Unconscious Emotions Involve Conscious Feelings II 
6.1. Theory 
To develop the idea that being mistaken about one’s feelings is not all that there is at issue, we 
may appeal to a more sophisticated understanding of consciousness. Philosophers and 
psychologists commonly draw a distinction between two levels of consciousness, usually 
understood in terms of points on a continuum without a sharp boundary between them. There are 
different versions of and names for the distinction, but the central idea is relatively clear. I shall 
adopt Goldie’s terms (Goldie, 2000, pp. 63–70). Goldie distinguishes between reflective and 
unreflective consciousness, the former being consciousness of our thoughts and feelings about 
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the world, the latter being consciousness of the world. Not only is having an emotion 
fundamentally a matter of being engaged with the world, he argues, so is feeling an emotion. 
Feeling focuses on its object, not on itself. We may therefore not identify ourselves as having the 
feelings towards the world we do until or unless we become reflectively conscious of them. 
 We may doubt that we really have feelings when unreflectively engaged with the world. 
We may grant that we can have thoughts—intentional content—directed onto the world without 
reflective consciousness; but could such unreflective states also have phenomenology? Goldie 
argues that they do by noting that, when asked to reflect on how we feel, we may be able to say 
what it is we feel, even though prior to that point, we had been “unaware” of our feelings. This 
may apply in the moment or it may apply across long stretches of time, as we reflect back on 
previous episodes of our lives. As I recall the episode, the feeling arises, and I come to realize 
that the feeling is one I had at the time. 
 The idea of feelings that are conscious but of which we are unaware can be defended by 
analogy with perceptual states. Two famous cases in the philosophical literature are that of 
suddenly realizing that there has been a pneumatic drill operating in the distance for some time, 
and that we heard it, but had not noticed it (Block, 1997); and that of a long-distance lorry driver 
who “comes to” after a period of absent-minded distraction and realizes that though he must 
have seen the road in order to drive safely, he has no recollection at all of doing so (Armstrong, 
1968). It can be argued that the sound and the sights were conscious, but the subject was not 
conscious of the perceptions. The perceptions were conscious not just in the sense of being 
directed onto the world, but also—being perceptions—in having a phenomenology (e.g. Dretske, 
1993). 
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 Goldie’s analysis argues that there are episodes of emotional feeling we undergo without 
being “reflectively conscious” of them, i.e. we are not aware that we are undergoing such feeling 
even though there is a legitimate sense in which the feelings are conscious. 
 This provides an explanation for how it is that unconscious emotions may manifest 
themselves in episodes of emotional feeling without themselves becoming conscious (while not 
needing to insist that feelings have little or no intentional content). If the feelings that manifest 
the emotion are only unreflectively conscious, the subject will not become reflectively conscious 
of the emotion, and so remain unaware that she has the emotion. Furthermore, the unreflective 
feelings may be masked by other feelings of which she is reflectively conscious, and this 
masking may be motivated. Psychological defence, then, may involve the exaggeration of or 
focused attention on some feelings at the expense of others, or even the creation of factitious 
feelings—feelings that are not manifestations of the real evaluative orientations the subject takes 
to the world; all of which serves to obscure from reflective consciousness the feelings that 
manifest the unconscious emotion. The Rat Man, then, does feel his hatred, but not in reflective 
consciousness, i.e. he is not conscious of feeling hatred. Furthermore, his feeling of hatred is 
masked by the feelings he is aware of, including his anxiety and his rather solicitous loving 
concern. (And if we wish, we may say this explains how it makes sense to say the Rat Man feels 
these feelings “instead of” hatred.) 
 
6.2. Evaluation 
This model is an apt description of many instances of unconscious emotion, and improves on the 
previous theory. But it, too, does not cover the whole field, particularly in psychoanalytic cases.  
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6.2.1. The disanalogy with perception 
In the examples from perception, if asked to direct her attention to what she heard or saw, the 
subject could have become reflectively conscious of what was unreflectively conscious. And 
Goldie uses this fact to argue for unreflectively conscious feelings. It is this argument that 
establishes their close link with consciousness and protects their integrity as feelings, i.e. having 
phenomenology. But this prevents the account from providing a satisfactory analysis of 
unconscious emotion generally, for in the case of the Rat Man, and many others in the 
psychoanalytic literature, the subject cannot simply turn his attention to the feelings he has in 
unreflective consciousness. The Rat Man, if asked, when moving the stone or afterwards, to 
direct his attention toward his feelings, would deny that he felt hatred or anything like it.  
 To save the theory, we may appeal to the fact that the subject is motivated not to bring 
such feelings into reflective consciousness and so may not be able to do so; and that other, 
reflectively conscious feelings mask the unreflectively conscious ones. The Rat Man, for 
instance, does report other feelings that we could plausibly argue stand in the way of his bringing 
his feelings of hatred to reflective awareness. In the examples from perception, neither of these 
two facts hold. But now we lack the very source of evidence for unreflectively conscious feelings 
that Goldie uses to introduce them, and the analogy with perception falters. Without the kind of 
retrospective confirmation described above, with the subject calling into reflective consciousness 
their earlier experience of feeling those emotions, why should we think that the unconscious 
emotion manifests itself in conscious feelings at all? 
 
 22 
6.2.2. The problem of absent feeling 
The objection is sharpened if we consider psychoanalytic cases in which the subject reports no 
particular feelings at the time of the emotional episode, rather than retrospectively. This 
eliminates the possibility that the lack of confirmation is due to an error of memory. The 
psychoanalyst Joyce McDougall describes patients she calls ‘normopathic’ (1986, Ch. 7). These 
patients appear to have very little inner, emotional life. They have a tendency to recount external 
events in a way which suggests little emotional or personal significance; the way they think and 
the way they relate to other people is very predominantly pragmatic. They generally disavow 
feeling emotions, and so they are also known as ‘alexithymics’ (from the Greek for ‘having no 
words for emotion’).7 However, on the basis of how they interact with other people and the 
emotions they arouse in others, psychoanalysts argue that they do in fact have emotions, but that 
they are very out of touch with them. Their form of psychological defence is to “project” their 
emotions into others. Put simply, they unconsciously imagine that other people have the 
emotions that they themselves have (while imagining that they themselves do not have these 
emotions), and interact with them in such a way to arouse such emotions in others—thus 
confirming the piece of imagination (see Gardner 1993, Ch. 6; Segal 1986, Ch. 4). In such cases, 
even at the very time at which such patients undergo an episode of emotional experience, they 
report having no emotional feelings. It could be that such feelings occur in unreflective 
consciousness and they are simply completely unable to access such feelings. But evidence for 
                                                
7 If an analogy with perception is to be made, it might seem that blindsight would provide a better counterpart, and 
Prinz (2004, Ch. 9) explores this possibility in relation to alexithymia. However, despite the analogy that the subject 
denies conscious perceptual/emotional experience, there are many important disanalogies regarding forced guessing 
and behaviour guidance. 
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this claim is lacking. And we may also argue that in such cases it would be more accurate to say 
the feelings are unconscious or to argue that no feelings occur at all. 
 
7. The Argument So Far 
Let us take stock. We first noted that there is no inconsistency in thinking that unconscious 
emotions manifest themselves in conscious feelings if we assume that feelings do not reveal the 
emotions they manifest. However, it is not plausible to think that all cases of unconscious 
emotion involve simple misunderstanding of conscious feelings, as we are then subject to some 
very radical misunderstandings indeed. To avoid this objection and explain the lack of 
understanding, “conscious feelings I” claimed, contentiously, that the conscious feelings have 
very little intentional content. To avoid the dilemma, we may adopt Goldie’s suggestion that 
feelings may occur unreflectively: the feeling is a state of consciousness of its object, but the 
subject is not conscious of the feeling. That such mental states can and do occur is seen in cases 
of perception in which attention is elsewhere.  
 “Conscious feelings II” presents a sophisticated interpretation of “conscious feeling”. 
Furthermore, it is consistent with the view that psychological defence is driven by mental pain, 
for it is the felt painful awareness of its object that motivates the subject to prevent the feeling 
from entering reflective awareness and to mask the feeling by others. However, there remain 
cases, particularly in the psychoanalytic literature, in which the analogy with perception does not 
apply, and the subject is completely unable, even with effort, to bring her feelings into reflective 
consciousness. In such cases, it seems reasonable to ask why we should accept that the subject 
has feelings that are conscious in any sense. 
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 Two paths lie ahead. The first, preserving the claim that feelings are necessarily 
conscious, argues that emotions—or unconscious emotions at least—need not manifest 
themselves in feelings at all. The second defends the concept of unconscious feelings. 
 
8. Unconscious Emotions Do Not Involve Feelings I 
8.1. Theory 
A number of accounts of emotion in the “cognitive” school defend the view that emotions do not 
essentially involve “feelings”. However, few philosophers have denied outright that there is any 
relation between emotion and feeling. As observed in § 2.1, the epistemological access that 
enables direct and non-inferential avowal of emotions is usually thought to involve a type of 
phenomenology distinctive of emotions. However, cognitivist theories, such as Nussbaum’s 
(2001), usually object to the idea that this is to be understood in terms of “feelings”. 
 Nussbaum argues that emotions are essentially thoughts with a particular type of content 
(relating to the subject’s well-being). She argues, additionally, that there are no extra 
“noncognitive” elements to emotion, such as feeling, as a correct analysis and understanding of 
the thoughts involved is sufficient to account for emotion. The distinctive phenomenology, such 
as it is, can be accounted for by the fact that we cannot think (episodically) those very 
thoughts—that the object of the emotion matters to me in a particular way—and retain our 
equanimity: “The recognizing and the upheaval, we want to say, belong to one and the same part 
of me, the part with which I make sense of the world” (p. 45). 
 She then observes that this creates a problem when accounting for (episodic) unconscious 
emotions, since “if we are prepared to recognize nonconscious emotional states…then we cannot 
possibly hold to any necessary phenomenological condition for that emotion-type” (p. 61). There 
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can’t be any unconscious feelings, since then “we seem to have lost our grip on the notion [of 
feeling] itself. Is it a kind of psychic energy? But what kind?” (p. 62, footnote). However, this 
means that to allow for unconscious emotions at all, as she wishes to do, Nussbaum must weaken 
her claim: “The upheaval is a part of the experience of what it is like to have those thoughts—at 
least much of the time” (p. 62). 
 
8.2. Evaluation 
But it is difficult to see how she can, in consistency, add this qualification. Is the “upheaval” 
constituted by having certain thoughts? or is it a normal result? The most charitable reading is 
that, when it occurs, the upheaval is constituted by the occurrence of the thoughts; but that under 
special circumstances, the thoughts can occur without the upheaval. In this way, it is the absence 
of upheaval that requires something additional, not its presence. In these circumstances, the 
thoughts, and so the episode of emotion, can be unconscious. But we are left in need of some 
account that explains the separation of the thoughts from the upheaval. 
 To return to Goldie’s original analysis, we allowed that emotions are dispositions to a 
variety of episodic mental states and processes, among which are episodes of emotional feeling. 
This is consistent with claiming that, under certain circumstances, the particular disposition to 
feeling (or upheaval) is never actualized. Let us say that repression, or other forms of 
psychological defence, undermine or overpower this dispositional property of emotions when 
rendering them unconscious. The emotions still retain their other dispositional powers, 
interacting with other mental states in particular ways, motivating us to act, and so on. This 
solves the puzzle, and we thereby also formulate an informative definition of unconscious 
emotion, viz. an emotion whose dispositional force to manifest itself in consciousness, i.e. to be 
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felt or cause upheaval, is prevented from achieving fulfilment. A version of this suggestion lay at 
the heart of Freud’s theory of unconscious emotion, maintaining that the main aim and 
achievement of repression is to suppress the development of feeling (Freud, 1915, § 3). 
 However, we need to consider more closely the episodes of unconscious emotional 
activity. What is it for an episode of hatred to occur but not be felt? Nussbaum may claim that it 
is for the relevant evaluative thoughts to occur unconsciously, without upheaval. This may 
sometimes be true, but the Rat Man does appear to be undergoing some kind of “upheaval”, one 
that Freud traces to the activity of his unconscious hatred. If upheaval is equivalent to “feeling”, 
for such cases in which the unconscious emotional activity does involve upheaval, Nussbaum’s 
theory collapses into either the claim that the Rat Man feels his hatred consciously (on the 
grounds that he undergoes upheaval) or that he feels his hatred unconsciously (on the grounds 
that the upheaval undergone is not consciously experienced in relation to thoughts of hatred). 
This is no longer the claim that unconscious emotions occur without feeling. 
 
9. Unconscious Emotions Do Not Involve Feelings II 
9.1. Theory 
Roberts (2003) presents a different account of how we may separate emotion, by which he means 
(in our terms) an episode of emotional activity, from feeling. He accepts an evaluative account of 
emotional content (emotions are “concern-based construals” (Ch. 2)), but provides a different 
account of feelings. To feel an emotion is an “immediate and quasi-perceptual grasp of oneself as 
in a certain emotional state” (p. 318). Now, “because emotions are self-involving in being based 
on some concern of the subject, consciousness of the object of the emotion powerfully 
predisposes the subject to be conscious of himself as in the emotional state” (p. 320). 
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Furthermore, like Nussbaum, Roberts emphasises this must be taken as the norm in the analysis 
of emotion: “when one does feel an emotion, the feeling and the emotion are two aspects of one 
mental state, rather than two separate ones” (p. 322). 
 However, this consciousness of oneself is not necessary, and in cases of psychological 
defence, it doesn’t occur: “Emotions are paradigmatically felt, but emotions may occur 
independently of the corresponding feeling” (p. 60). As noted in § 6, we can add that 
psychological defence may bring about feelings that mask the emotion defended against, e.g. 
unconscious fear of failure may cause conscious feelings of superiority and even conscious fears 
of other kinds, but not of failure. Feeling one’s emotions, being a “quasi-perceptual” state, like 
other forms of perception, comes in degrees not only of accuracy, but also of awareness. 
Psychological defence may work on both accuracy and awareness. 
 
9.2. Evaluation 
This line of thought provides a synoptic account of the many forms of “being unconscious” an 
emotion may take. It allows not only that we may misunderstand what we feel (§ 5.1), and that 
we may not be fully aware of what we feel (§ 6.1), but also that episodes of emotional activity 
(construals) can occur outside awareness altogether. In such a case, they occur without any 
feeling at all. The Rat Man simply does not have any “quasi-perceptual grasp” of himself in a 
state of hatred. Nevertheless, he is, and this fact has consequences for his actions and his other 
mental states. 
 This model is suggested by a different motif in psychoanalytic phenomena, viz. that 
psychoanalytic therapy can acquaint subjects with their emotions for the first time. As they come 
to understand the emotions they had during earlier episodes of their lives, they come to feel the 
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emotion now—but this is the first time they actually feel the emotion, pace Goldie; they have no 
recollection of feeling during those earlier episodes. This accounts well for the case of 
alexithymic patients: it is right to say that they simply do not feel their emotions. If 
psychoanalysis improves their condition, they begin to feel their emotions. 
 It is not clear, however, that Roberts’ account of feeling can completely resolve our 
puzzle. Roberts means to connect the verb “to feel”, of which he gives the epistemological 
analysis above (consciousness of oneself in a particular emotional state), and the 
phenomenological noun “feeling”. But I do not think he intends this to be reductive, e.g. he 
describes the “affect” of an emotion as its “mood”, and says that “an important part of the ‘feel’ 
of an emotion is its mood” (p. 114). And it is on this phenomenological aspect of feeling that we 
may press Roberts: when one undergoes an emotion that one does not feel in Roberts’ terms (as a 
construal of oneself), is there nevertheless “something it is like”, some “feeling”, attached to the 
episode? Roberts’ solution only works if we accept that emotional thoughts can occur without 
phenomenology. Of any theory which maintains that feeling is distinct from episodes of 
emotional activity, we may press the question of how the conscious upheavals the Rat Man 
undergoes are to be explained by a phenomenologically quiescent unconscious emotional state. 
This is a version of the objection made in § 5.2.2—whether psychological defence can be 
properly understood without invoking unconscious feelings. 
 
Both the psychoanalytically inspired defence of unconscious feelings and the physiological and 
neurological accounts of feeling seek to provide an analysis of feeling that is not dependent on 
consciousness, on the basis of more general theories of mental functioning. There is insufficient 
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space to evaluate the theories on which they rely, so I shall not do more than raise general issues 
regarding the assumed theoretical approach. 
 
10. Unconscious Emotions Involve Unconscious Feelings 
10.1. Theory 
Gardner (1993) presses the objection repeated above, that we have good reason to believe in 
unconscious feelings, because only if unconscious mental states are felt can we explain what we 
do with them. Only the painfulness of thoughts or emotions explains why and how we reject 
them. The alternative theory, that the thought or emotion would become painful if it were 
conscious, supposes that consciousness in some sense creates the pain (which cannot exist 
without consciousness), rather than consciousness being of something that is, already, painful (p. 
216). 
 To support the argument, we must turn to a general theory of the mind. In talking of 
emotional feeling, we are talking of the phenomenology of an emotional episode, what it is like, 
its experiential quality. Wollheim (1984, Ch. 2) argues, and many philosophers of mind now 
agree, that the experiential quality of a mental state and its representational content are 
inextricably intertwined (e.g. Harman, 1990; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995; Crane, 1998).8 In this, 
Nussbaum is right. According to Wollheim, it is in virtue of the product of the two together that a 
mental state has the causal powers it does, and so engages in the mental processes it does. It 
could not have the causal powers it does without the phenomenology it has. Its phenomenal 
                                                
8 Rather confusingly, Wollheim calls the experiential quality ‘subjectivity’ rather than ‘phenomenology’, and uses 
‘phenomenology’ to refer to the joint product of subjectivity and intentionality. I follow the use of ‘phenomenology’ 
that is more common in the philosophy of mind literature. 
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properties, however, are not dependent for their existence on being apprehended in 
consciousness, and may exist outside consciousness. 
 This commitment to unconscious phenomenology, unconscious feelings, is not a 
commitment, Gardner argues, to unfelt feelings. Gardner’s (and Wollheim’s) argument at this 
point is dense, but my understanding is that feeling is interpreted not as a form of conscious 
awareness, but in terms of a type of “impact” feelings have (perhaps in contrast with quiescent 
types of thought). The feelings still impinge upon the subject. The episode of emotional activity 
has phenomenology, and it has its effects as a result of this phenomenology, i.e. how it feels. But 
the subject may not be conscious of this feeling: “What it is that extends beyond consciousness 
in the case of unconscious pain is just what it is that is apprehended when pain is consciously 
given. Thus it would be a mistake to think that the supposition of unconscious pain involves 
unfelt or unfeelable pain” (Gardner, 1993, p. 217). We may extend the point to emotional 
feelings generally. Gardner’s analysis of the Rat Man is, then, that he feels his hatred 
unconsciously, and this episode of feeling interacts with other mental states and events, such as 
his motivation to replace the stone, in ways similar to how it would were it conscious (allowing 
for the different nature and modes of expression of unconscious states noted by psychoanalytic 
theory). 
 Although Gardner’s analysis sounds similar to Goldie’s argument for unreflective 
feeling, it is worth noting the difference between the two accounts. The model of unreflective 
awareness discussed in § 6, and the arguments by which it was set up, suggested that emotional 
feelings are available to the subject’s reflective consciousness, by means of redirecting attention, 
even if this requires effort to overcome the motivation not to recognise the existence or nature of 
the feelings. In Gardner’s hands, unconscious feeling can be completely inaccessible to 
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consciousness. There is no suggestion here that we may be able to access to it by directing our 
attention in a certain way. Goldie ties feeling to consciousness far more closely that Gardner, 
arguing for a separation only as a result of inattention. We therefore have a three-fold division: 
what is reflectively conscious, what is unreflectively conscious, and what is unconscious. 
However, it is worth noting that what is unconscious in Gardner’s sense is still dependent on 
consciousness in general. No organism that cannot feel consciously can feel unconsciously—the 
psychoanalytic unconscious occurs only in beings with relatively sophisticated consciousness. 
 
10.2. Evaluation 
Unsurprisingly, this theory is the most potent of those we have surveyed in its explanatory force: 
there are no cases that make it fail as a general account of unconscious emotion. It does not need 
to insist that every case of what we may rightly term unconscious emotion must be interpreted in 
terms of unconscious feeling, for there is no threat to it in allowing that the explanations offered 
in §§ 5.1 and 6.1 may hold true in certain cases. Its philosophical weakness, many will say, lies 
in its commitment to unconscious phenomenology. 
 Unconscious feelings are not to be understood by analogy with cases of hearing a drill in 
the background or coming to after a period of absent-minded driving. But for precisely this 
reason, independent of the theoretical considerations, it can be difficult to accept that 
unconscious states, in contrast to reflectively and unreflectively conscious states, have 
phenomenology. That there can be no unconscious feelings is still the position of 
“commonsense”. But this is not a conclusive objection: commonsense is what produces the 
puzzle of unconscious emotion in the first place, and Gardner and Wollheim’s general theory of 
mental functioning, which supports Gardner’s theory of unconscious emotion, is, they argue, an 
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extension of commonsense psychology (Gardner, 1993, Chh. 1, 4; Wollheim, 1993, Ch. VI; see 
also Hopkins, 1982). If we can find sufficient explanatory drive to posit them, then we have 
reason to accept their existence. The need to appeal, in cases like the Rat Man and alexithymic 
patients, to phenomenological states to which subjects cannot turn their attention provides the 
requisite explanatory demand. 
 Given the general difficulty here of accepting the idea of unconscious phenomenology, 
despite the disanalogy we have remarked between unconscious feelings and perceptual cases, 
defenders of unconscious feeling may take strength from the fact that a number of theorists have 
independently defended the claim that phenomenal properties can occur independently of the 
subject’s being conscious of them (e.g. Burge, 1997; Rosenthal, 1991). For example, Burge’s 
defence is not dissimilar to Gardner’s, arguing that while what it is like to experience a 
phenomenal property in consciousness is essential to typing that property, the property may 
occur without consciousness (pp. 432f.). He also allows that not all such cases of unconscious 
phenomenology are simply a matter of inattention. Of course, this is not uncontroversial, but if 
we need to accept non-conscious phenomenology quite independently of psychoanalytic 
considerations, this supports Gardner’s hand. However, critics will reply that the implications of 
the debate in perception are only that unreflectively conscious states have phenomenology, so 
that it is Goldie’s theory, not Gardner’s that gains support. 
 
11. Feelings and Physiology 
11.1. Theory 
As a final attempt to remove some of the “mystery” of what unconscious feelings (or 
phenomenal properties generally) could be, it can be tempting to provide an account of them in 
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non-psychological terms. If feelings could be identified with some physiological or neurological 
state, then we could have criteria independent of the subject’s consciousness for asserting that 
such feelings do or do not exist. The first path, that of identifying feelings with physiology, has a 
long history in the theory of emotion; the second is a more recent development. Damasio (1994) 
provides a way into the first, his (1999) into the second. 
 Damasio (1994, esp. Ch. 7) argues that the essence of an emotion, by which he means an 
episode of emotion, is changes in one’s body, such as pulse, breathing, skin conductance but also 
visceral and hormonal alterations, in response to an evaluative images of the emotion’s object. 
The profile of these changes is then represented in the brain. However, Damasio then argues that 
a subject does not feel an emotion unless she experiences the bodily changes and relates them to 
the images which caused them. An episode of emotional activity and feeling an emotion are 
distinct. 
 Each family of theories of unconscious feelings could attempt to use Damasio’s ideas to 
understand unconscious emotions. The “conscious feelings” family could argue that a subject 
will be (unreflectively) aware of, but misunderstand, the physiological changes that occur. 
Without relating the experienced bodily changes back to the object of the emotion, to the extent 
that she is aware of them, the subject doesn’t understand the feelings as emotional (they are 
experienced as bodily feelings instead, e.g. heart palpitations, not fear). The “no feelings” family 
could emphasize Damasio’s claim that feeling an emotion is distinct from undergoing an 
emotional episode, arguing that bodily changes provide us with a criterion for an episode of 
emotional activity without feeling. The “unconscious feelings” family could adapt the theory to 
claim that the bodily changes comprising the emotional episode provide us with an account of 
the ontology of unconscious feelings: these bodily changes have the requisite sort of “impact” on 
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the subject to count as feelings, all that is missing is consciousness of them as such (a significant 
emphasis on the involvement and role of the body in unconscious emotion is uncontroversial in 
most psychoanalytic theories). 
 
11.2. Evaluation 
Although many theories are happy to accept that feelings are, in some sense, grounded in or 
related to (if not reducible to) physiological alterations, there are two important objections to 
using the theory to resolve the puzzle of unconscious emotions. First, it is unclear whether such 
bodily changes could tell us which emotion the subject is undergoing. Given that the Rat Man’s 
experiences a number of conscious feelings, could his physiological state alone also determine 
whether he was also undergoing hatred? Cases of episodes of unconscious emotional activity 
often involve multiple emotions, and there is currently little evidence to suggest that evidence 
from physiological responses could make the requisite distinctions even in far less complicated 
cases (see Prinz (2004), pp. 72–74 for discussion). Second, Damasio goes on to allow that 
changes in the body needn’t actually occur for feeling to take place. It is possible for the mental 
images that would trigger the physiological changes in the body to instead trigger an “as if” 
representation of the body state in the brain, and this can be sufficient for feeling. It is possible, 
therefore, for a subject to undergo a felt episode of emotion without changes to the body. If such 
an “as if” representation of body state could occur without consciousness, there could there be 
unconscious episodes of emotion—indeed, unconscious feelings—that do not involve bodily 
changes. So physiology will not provide a reliable criterion for the occurrence of unconscious 
emotional episodes. 
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12. Feelings, Physiology and Phenomenal Properties 
12.1. Theory 
When, in his later work, Damasio discusses the question of feelings and consciousness (1999, pp. 
279–285), he distinguishes between “having a feeling”—essentially the representation of the 
bodily changes that constitute the emotion (whether those changes in fact occur or are 
represented “as if”)—and “feeling a feeling”, a matter of knowing that one has that feeling, 
which involves relating the feeling to the sense of self. This entails that feelings can occur 
without one’s knowledge of them, i.e. without one’s consciousness of them. In this development 
of the theory, however, the possible existence of unconscious feelings is not tied to physiological 
changes, but to mental representations that “arise out of” patterns of neural firing. 
 
12.2. Evaluation 
I am unclear whether Damasio wishes to endorse unconscious feelings. He endorses very 
extensive unconscious mental processes (pp. 226–228, 296–302), but in the discussion above, he 
states: “When those images [that comprise feeling an emotion] are accompanied, one instant 
later, by a sense of self in the act of knowing…they become conscious” (p. 282, my italics). 
Whether, in organisms that have the “core consciousness” (Chh. 3, 6) that grounds the requisite 
sense of self, feelings could ever remain unconscious, even if they begin that way, is unclear. It 
seems that Damasio could equally endorse a position like Goldie’s; or again, given the 
importance of relating the emotion to the self in the production of feeling, there are similarities to 
Roberts’ “no feeling” theory. Damasio’s neurophysiological theory does not settle which 
solution to our problem we should settle on. 
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 A number of philosophers have sought to identify phenomenology with 
neurophysiological properties (e.g. Tye, 1995; Kirk, 1994; Prinz, 2004). To defend unconscious 
feeling against the commonsense objection to unconscious phenomenology of any kind, one 
could bring Damasio’s model together with these more general philosophical accounts: an 
unconscious feeling does occur, because the requisite neural pattern occurs. 
 This move faces two problems. First, as remarked at the end of § 10.2, the philosophical 
accounts are developed for perceptual phenomenal properties that are readily accessible to 
consciousness, although not in fact conscious. Second, the identification of phenomenal 
properties with properties of brain functioning is hugely controversial. Damasio wants to hold a 
distance between them, saying the mental properties “arise out of” the neural ones (1999, 
Appendix), but that the latter could, and do, occur without the former (e.g. p. 74). Unless we take 
issue with this claim, we still have little reason for thinking that the occurrence of the neural 
property in the absence of consciousness is tantamount to an occurrence of unconscious 
phenomenology rather than the absence of phenomenology. So although this line of argument 
may seem to offer support to Gardner’s defence of unconscious feelings by providing an realist 
ontology, Gardner himself claims it is at odds with his explicit attempt to preserve the 
painfulness of unconscious pain, not merely its neurological underpinnings (1993, p. 218). 
 
13. Conclusion 
This survey has not reached any firm conclusions. Within the conscious feelings family, 
philosophers may insist that feelings must, in some sense, be conscious. To the objection that 
without subjects’ recall, there is no evidence for their position, they may now use the argument 
of the unconscious feelings theorist: episodes of unconscious emotional activity are not 
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phenomenologically quiescent, but have an “impact” on the subject. The no feelings family may 
reply that no feelings occur, and the proper of understanding this “impact” is not through 
phenomenology but through the thought content of the emotion (this response is open to Roberts, 
but not Nussbaum, as she equates thinking the thought content to upheaval). As remarked at the 
outset, emotions are manifest in various effects upon other mental states; unless one accepts 
Wollheim’s theory of mental functioning, according to which phenomenology is necessary for 
such effects, the no feelings theorist may argue that they occur in the absence of feelings. 
Finally, the unconscious feelings theorist may argue that this commitment to equating feelings to 
conscious feelings is undermined by explanatory requirements emerging both from discussions 
of perception and from psychoanalytic case studies. Following Freud’s (1915) distinction 
between the preconscious and the unconscious, they may further argue that there is a distinction 
in kind between that which prevents unreflectively conscious feelings from entering (reflective) 
consciousness and that which prevents unconscious feelings from so doing, and so the theory of 
unreflective consciousness cannot do the requisite work. All three theories may (but need not) 
appeal to Damasio’s work on the bodily origins and/or nature of emotional feelings to help in 
explaining the “impact” that unconscious emotions may have. 
 Some philosophers, drawing on considerations from Wittgenstein or Merleau-Ponty, may 
feel that the discussion took a wrong turn—“inwards”—in § 10. Rather than defend unconscious 
feelings via a realist theory of “phenomenal properties” (whether or not these are identified with 
neural properties), the question should be even more firmly situated within the need to explain 
human behaviour. The development of a metaphysical mental realism will not solve the question 
of what the Rat Man felt nor what alexithymics feel nor explain what role the notion of 
“unconscious feeling” can play in our understanding of human life. Many psychoanalysts will 
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note that more needs to be said about the ways in which psychological defence can transform 
emotions and emotional feelings (e.g. Lacewing, 2005), as in the case of alexithymics’ projection 
of emotion. I confess some sympathy with both these responses, and suspect that future work in 
developing a solution to our puzzle will need to take account of them. 
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